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Summit of International Monetary Law
Fundamental principles of international monetary law are being
established in a multilateral treaty with 107 signatories to regulate the
use of a new "money" known as "special drawing rights" (SDR's),
which are intended to provide liquidity for expanding world com-
merce. 1
That is briefly the challenging objective of recently approved
amendments to the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund (called the Fund or the IMF), which was approved at
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and became legally effective on
December 27, 1945. The amendments are to carry into effect the
provisions in an "Outline of a Facility Based on Special Drawing Rights
in the Fund," approved at the meeting of the Fund's Board of
Governors at Rio de Janeiro in September 1967, by a resolution which
instructed the Executive Directors to formulate appropriate amend-
ments to the Articles.
Basic Provisions In IMF Agreement
After ratification, these amendments will amplify the code of legal
obligations of the signatories which introduced limitations on the
exercise of their sovereignty to replace the void that existed prior to
their adoption.
This code creates international monetary law as a sector of public
international law. In accordance therewith, the parties had, in the first
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place, to agree with the Fund on the par value of their respective
currencies, and avoid restrictions on payments and transfers for current
international transactions, discriminatory currency arrangements, multi-
ple currency practices, fluctuating exchange rates, and certain trans-
actions in gold at non-parity prices. Secondly, the Articles endowed the
Fund with a pool of resources to which members might resort when
they had to fulfill their obligations under the Articles. Thirdly, they
created an international institution, the International Monetary Fund,
to interpret the code of conduct and supervise its application,
administer the resources, and serve as a center for consultation and
collaboration with members on all matters related to the Articles.
The resources of the Fund comprise mainly the subscriptions of
the members, each of which must pay 25% thereof in gold and the rest
in its own currency. Quotas may be increased. After a member has
established a par value for its currency in accordance with the Articles
and paid in full its subscription, it may purchase other members'
currencies in exchange for its own, for example, to meet difficulties in
its balance of payments.
The Fund thus provides means to support policies consistent with
its Articles. However, a member is not to prolong its use of the Fund's
resources unduly, and is subject to complex rules on the repurchase of
the currencies it has paid to the Fund, the repurchase to be made in
gold or the convertible currencies of other members, and within three
to five years. The Fund can sell whatever it holds of a member's
currency to other members, and thereby reduce the member's duty to
repurchase its own currency.
A member can purchase the currencies of other members from the
Fund in an amount equal to 25 percent of its quota in any period of 12
months ending on the date of purchase. The amount between levels of
exchange measured at 25 percent of the quota is called by the French
work "tranche" (slice). The first tranche corresponds to the subscrip-
tion in gold and is called the "gold tranche." The succeeding tranches
are called "credit" tranches, despite the fact it is not legally correct to
classify transactions with the Fund in terms of creditor-debtor
relations.
In short, members contribute gold and currency to the Fund,
which then owns such resources. The Fund sells currencies in return for
the participant's currency and in due course the participant must buy
back its own currency from the Fund. The term "credit" and
"creditor" are used in practice because the economic effects of the
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transactions are said to resemble in some respects those of credit
operations.2
The "gold tranche" is now usually treated by members as an
"asset" that could be ranked with their holdings of gold and reserve
currencies. This is attributable primarily to the fact that the virtual
certainty of its ready availability has given it wide-spread recognition as
a new reserve asset. Credit tranches are distinguished from the gold
tranche, with its "automatic" character, by the fact that a member
which resorts to them is regarded as receiving assistance from the Fund.
SDR's and Liquidity
For a number of years, monetary experts have been striving to
develop an international agreement to assure the world of sufficient
liquidity by a process of deliberate and concerted action. Liquidity in
this sense has been defined as meaning "reserves, either owned or
readily available, that monetary authorities can use to support the sta-
bility of their own currencies. '
The need for deliberately creating liquidity was realized when the
United States began to endeavor to reduce the deficit in its balance of
payments by taking more and more drastic measures to curb the
outflow of dollars. It was aggravated by the ever-increasing acquisition
of gold by fabricators and private hoarders rather than by central
banks.
The continued decline in the quantity of monetary gold in reserves
would, it was feared, restrict international economic activity.
The Fund reviews quotas every five years and has increased them
twice, with the result that the total of quotas has grown from the
equivalent of $6.772 billion on December 27, 1945, to the equivalent
of $20.987 billion on November 1, 1967. These increases augment the
foreign exchange available to help overcome difficulties in international
payments, mainly through purchases in the credit tranches.
However, experts felt that something more was needed. Over the
last two years discussions and negotiations have been conducted
primarily in two international bodies: the Executive Directors of the
IMF, which is in continuous session, and the deputies of the Finance
Ministers and Governors of Central Banks of the Group of Ten,i.e.,
industrial countries that are participants in the Fund's General
2 Gold 366, 368, 369.
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Arrangements to Borrow (the United States, Deutsche Bundesbank,
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium,
Sveriges Riksbank).
They "hammered out" the "Outline of a Facility based on Special
Drawing Rights in the Fund." The Fund's Board of Governors at Rio de
Janeiro in September 1967 adopted a resolution which instructed the
Executive Directors to convert the Outline into a draft of amendments
to the Articles and By-laws of the Fund, which was completed last
March. The amendments have been submitted to the 107 members, and
the United States has enacted legislation approving them.
Main Features of the Amendments
From the viewpoint of the international lawyer as well as the
economist, the main feature of the amendments is that they provide for
the deliberate control, whether by creation or cancellation, of
international liquidity. This new regime is to replace dependence on
more or less fortuitous factors, such as the amount of new gold
production, whether it is used in monetary reserves, or the manufacture
of jewelry, etc., or disappears in the "caches" of hoarders, or is
absorbed in the deficits of reserve currency countries, or is displaced by
interest-bearing treasury bills in the assets listed as reserves by central
banks. Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of the Fund, at
the meeting of Rio de Janeiro which adopted the plan, admirably
described the document as follows:
"The Outline reflects the principle that the international commun-
ity should be able to control reserves, instead of reserves controlling the
community. When a collective judgment is made that it is desirable to
supplement existing reserves, there need be no fumbling for ad hoc
solutions. The risk has been dispelled that for the lack of agreed
international arrangements countries would find themselves driven to
adopt solutions dictated not by reason but by force of circumstances."
Legal Character of SDR's
According to the general counsel of the IMF, the legal nature of
SDR's is such that they will not be usable in market operations but
only as between monetary authorities. The new "asset" is not a form of
legal tender. The holder will use its rights to get a currency and will use
this currency to discharge its obligations.
The Fund will designate a participant which is in a strong position
from the viewpoint of its balance of payments or reserves. A
4 Gold, 377.
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participant's obligation to accept the asset will depend on whether the
Fund has designated it as acceptor, and whether it is holding less Than
the maximum amount it can be required to hold. However, once the
participant has been designated as acceptor of the rights, it is under a
legal obligation to accept them.
Right to Use SDR's Unconditional
The primordial quality of special drawing rights is the uncondi-
tional character of the right to use them. A participant cannot be
hampered in its use of special drawing rights by the charge that it is not
doing what it is supposed to do. In this respect the SDR is superior to
the gold tranche in which purchases are now automatic only in fact,
although a proposed amendment would give purchases in this tranche a
de jure unconditional quality. The guide line for the recipient of SDR's
is that they are to be used for "balance of payments needs in the light
of developments in its total reserves and not for the sole purpose of
changing the composition of its reserves."' The currency provided in
return for special drawing rights must be convertible in fact. The U.S.A.
could request dollars, or the acceptor could present dollars or the
currency of another country, instead of its own, as long as the currency
is in fact convertible.
In principle, a participant that is designated to provide currency
for SDR's under the Fund's guidance is absolutely obligated to provide
it. A breach of this obligation may be punished by a suspension of the
use of all SDR's by the violator, whereas in the case of a breach of any
other obligation, the suspension relates only to SDR's afterwards
acquired.
Nevertheless, a participant's obligation to provide currency in
return for special drawing rights is limited to an amount equal to three
times a participant's net cumulative allocation, although it may agree to
hold more.
Reconstitution of Rights
In evolving the plan, there was much controversy over the
concepts of whether the SDR's represented "credit" or "money," or
whether a participant should be able to use the new asset without any
obligation to restore its holdings of the asset. Unless such an obligation
5 Gold, 381, 383.
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existed, apprehension was expressed that the asset could be used to
finance deficits of unnecessarily long or permanent duration, which
might impose a continuous strain on the real resources of surplus
countries. Proponents of this view pointed to the Fund's existing
requirements to assure that the use of exchange purchased from it
should not extend beyond three to five years.
A compromise solution was adopted: a participant indicated by
the Fund accepts rights and gives its currency in exchange. The
participant's use of SDR's during the immediately preceding five years
is not to exceed 70 percent of the average net cumulative allocation of
its rights during that period. In other words, its average holdings-as
distinguished from "use" of SDR's-during a five-year period should
not be less than 30 percent of the average during the same period of the
participant's net cumulative allocation.
Participants are to endeavor to maintain a balanced relationship
between their holdings of SDR's and other reserves.
Gold Value Guarantee of Rights-Interest
SDR's will be expressed in a unit of value equal to 0.888671 grains
of gold nine-tenths fine, i.e., the weight and fineness of gold content
of the United States dollar in effect on July 1, 1944. The maintenance
of the gold value of SDR's is an important characteristic which gives the
rights their quality as an asset. This is indeed a novel concept-giving an
entry in an account a worth equal to its attributed "weight in gold."
Another feature to make them attractive is that holders of SDR's
will receive interest paid in SDR's, but will similarly contribute to the
cost in proportion to the net cumulative allocations to them. This
makes the SDR's comparable in a sense to interest-bearing Treasury
bills under the gold exchange standard, and makes them preferable to
holdings in the gold tranche which pay nothing.
The General Account and the Special Drawing Account
While all present transactions and operations of the Fund are
conducted through the General Account, the transactions and opera-
tions of the new facility will be carried out in a separate account,
known as the Special Drawing Account. The word "account" is used to
obviate confusion arising from the fact that the staff of the Fund is
organized in "departments." The two accounts will have their separate
and respective resources. Whereas the operations of the General
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Account have been conducted with owned or borrowed resources, a
participant that wishes to use its SDR's will obtain the currency
directly from another participant, and not from a pool of resources
contributed by participants.6
Procedure in Decisions
Authority is carefully distributed as between the Board of
Governors, the Executive Directors, and the Managing Director in
reaching decisions for the allocation or cancellation of SDR's. After
consulting with interested persons, the Managing Director initiates a
proposal to allocate or cancel rights, and submits it to the Executive
Directors for their concurrence. Then the proposal goes to the Board of
Governors for a decision by a majority of 85% of the total voting
power.
In the course of the discussions, the then French Minister of
Finance and Economy, Mr. Debre, insisted that the reserve currency
countries, i.e., the United Kingdom and the United States, would have to
balance their payments before the new plan was activated. It is clearly
understood that SDR's will not be allocated to deal with the balance of
payments difficulties of individual countries, although once they have
been apportioned in accordance with the quotas they may be utilized
for that purpose. Decisions will provide for allocations at uniform rates
to all participants. Nevertheless, after accepting a compulsory mini-
mum, a participant will be able to "opt out" of an allocation.
Mr. Schweitzer sums up the nature of Special Drawing Rights in
this way: They will be essentially entries in the books of the Fund.
Their use will be confined to national monetary authorities, and
perhaps one or two international bodies, including the General Account
of the Fund itself. Some people like to think of them as money, others
as a form of credit. As Dr. Emminger, former Chairman of the Deputies
of the Group of Ten, has aptly put it, they are a sort of zebra which can
with equal accuracy be described as a white animal with black stripes or
a black animal with white stripes. The material point is not how they
are named but what can be done with them.
Their value, says Mr. Schweitzer, will derive essentially from the
fact that participants will be obliged to accept them when properly
transferred and to provide in exchange convertible currency or gold, up
to a point where they are holding three times as many drawing rights as
6 Gold, 390.
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have been allocated to them by the Fund. The acceptance limit was set
at this level in order to ensure that, on any reasonable view, the scheme
would be endowed with a sufficient margin of liquidity.7
Evolution of International Monetary Principles
From a historical viewpoint SDR's are interesting because they
reflect principles and practices that have evolved in monetary law at
least since around 500 B.C. in ancient Sparta. Its money consisted of
iron coins with no intrinsic worth but which derived their value as a
medium of exchange because they were limited in number. An SDR,
which is merely a book entry, has as such no intrinsic value, despite its
gold value guarantee.
However, it is limited by the number that the Fund issues from
time to time, by the member's quota, and in other ways. Nevertheless,
dependence on gold is shown by the fact that the SDR's may be used
by one member to obtain from another participant in the Special
Drawing Account a desired amount of its currency that is pegged to the
dollar, which can be exchanged for gold at $35.00 an ounce. This
relates back to the introduction of the gold standard at a conference of
monetary officials of the leading city-states or countries held in Genoa
in 1445-1447. International commerce had been disrupted because of
the Hundred Years War. The government decided to revive it by
agreeing to settle balances due between merchants or the governments
themselves by making payments in gold, in the form of a new gold
florin.
The use of the gold standard developed over four and two-thirds
centuries, but broke down in World War I because Britain did not have
enough gold to pay her debts to her Allies and Dominions. British
bankers got around this difficulty by obtaining approval at a second
conference of Genoa in 1922, of what is known as the gold exchange
standard. In order to economize in the use of gold, the conferees agreed
that a country could issue interest-bearing Treasury bills redeemable in
gold. They were actually considered to be better than gold because they
bore interest, whereas owning gold involved storage charges.
On the theory that the holders of interest-bearing Treasury bills
would not all seek at the same time to redeem them in gold at the Bank
of England, Britain issued IOU's far in excess of its capacity to pay the
7 Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director, IMF, The New Arrangements to Supplement
World Reserves and their Implications for the Developing Countries, December 5, 1967.
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promised gold. The United States was not a participant in the Genoa
Conference of 1922 because it had not recognized the League of
Nations, but it followed the same practice and now has outstanding in
the ownership of foreigners interest-bearing IOU's to the extent of
some $32.467 billion, of which $14.3 billion are owed to foreign
Central Banks and the balance is owed to nonresident private holders
and international organizations such as the IMF. The United States gold
stock rose to around $24.563 billions in December 1949 but has since
declined to around $10.4 billions.
By a pure coincidence of course, the cumulation of deficits in the
balance of payments that were incurred during 17 out of the last 18
years is about equal in amount to the previously mentioned total
liability to foreigners. It is indeed ironic that the cumulative figure of
the dollars given away in excess of our income to provide economic and
military assistance to other nations should now be approximately
matched by claims of foreign Central Banks and others that are more
than three times the stock of gold of $10.4 billion which is to assure
their redemption.
Normally, to pay off a deficit in the balance of payments a
government takes measures to reduce the debits and increase the credits
in its balance of payments to the point where its accounts show a
surplus. It could then use the surplus gold or foreign exchange thus
acquired in its trading and investment relations with other countries to
pay off its deficit.
The U.S.A. has had in the last few years large deficits, the latest
figure of the one incurred in 1967 being $3.57 billion. It is taking
strong measures in 1968 to reduce appreciably the current deficit.
Obviously as long as the war in Viet Nam continues it does not appear
likely that the United States will be able to reduce its outlay overseas
sufficiently to achieve equilibrium. Even if the amendments to the
Bretton Woods agreement are adopted, presumably the U.S.A. and
Britain would have to balance their payments before members with 85
percent of the voting power will activate them. In view of the $1.4
billion that has been recently provided to France and the $2 billion
provided for Britain, the contemplated quotas of SDR's-e.g. for the
U.S.A.-$250 million out of a suggested annual issue of $1 billion
hardly seems adequate to take care of major situations. Would doubling
or trebling the annual issues be sufficient?
Economists should be asked a basic question about SDR's. Let us
suppose that the U.S.A. achieves equilibrium-which Secretary Fowler
has defined as around $250 million above or below zero-and the plan
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is activated, then in the following year, say 1970, let us suppose that
the U.S.A. suffers a deficit of $500 million. If the Fund issues only $1
billion of SDR's a year, the U.S. allotment of 25% will be only $250
million. The Treasury can ask the Fund to designate one or more
countries to sell to the U.S. its currency to that extent. A country
designated by the Fund will be committed by the amendments to
provide its own currency, or the currency of another country-even
dollars, or gold equivalent to that amount. The SDR's will in this case
provide exchange that will only go "half-way round," but the U.S.A.
could, it would seem, draw on its "gold tranche" in the Fund for the
balance. This sounds very simple and presupposes that the country
designated has the currency available to meet the demand of the U.S.A.
What happens if it does not have that much money available?
Presumably if the receiving country has a sufficient amount of another
foreign currency in its monetary reserves, it could deliver that instead.
SDR's merely call for payments out of the existing money supply
in the designated country and not for the printing of new money.
Bird's Eye View of the Operation of SDRs
In order to visualize the operation of the scheme, one could
imagine the managing director of the Fund sitting on a summit looking
over the hills and valleys of the economic situations of the 107 member
countries in all parts of the world, and watching the countless
transactions between their respective nationals-buying and selling,
rendering all kinds of services, investing, lending, licensing, et cetera,
and the consequent crisscrossing of payments of all kinds. He has at
hand the rules prescribed in the code provided in the Amended Articles
of the Bretton Woods Agreement.
At any given moment, some countries are receiving more than
they pay out, others are paying out more than they receive, and still
others have a relative balance of debits and credits. All 107 members
are to receive their fixed quotas of SDR's, but it appears that they are
to be used mainly when a country has a deficit in its balance of
payments. The deficits in certain countries are in theory, if not
actually, offset by surpluses in others. More specifically, the U.S. deficit
is offset by surpluses in Germany, Italy, and other countries.
Hence, the U.S.A. and all the other members of the Fund which
have deficits can ask the managing director of the fund to designate a
country or countries to which they can present their SDR's in exchange
for currencies. These countries are bound to give their currencies up to
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the limits fixed by the code-apparently up to three times the quota
unless the central bank is disposed to give more.
The Managing Director is to guide the U.S.A. and the other deficit
countries to those which have a strong balance of payments position-
which presumably means a surplus- and more than it needs of
monetary reserves. The designated acceptor is obligated to meet the
request and provide its own currency, or the currency of a third
country or gold. Perhaps the strongest foreign country today is
Germany. Prior to the events of last June, France was in a very strong
position but since then it has had to be supplied with $1.4 billion. Italy
is fairly strong today but has recently climbed out of a recession. How
many countries are there which might feel disposed to turn over most
of their surplus to finance the deficit of the United States or any other
member of the IMF? Certainly they may want to keep part of their
surplus in the balance of payments or reserves as a hedge against
adversity such as was suffered recently by France. How much of their
surplus may have already been committed to a country in trouble, such
as France or to Britain, and how much more will be needed by the
latter before it really overcomes its deficit or can make the basic
economic adjustments necessary to stand on its own feet?
Then too can each of these countries provide out of its existing
supply of currency the amounts needed to meet the demands of the
deficit countries? If they meet this year's demands, and the deficits are
not cured, will they have enough next year to meet additional demands
out of the new SDR's that will be issued.
In short, if $1 billion in SDR's is issued in 1969, they will be
distributed to surplus as well as to deficit countries, but presumably
they would be used only by the latter. If the issue is $1 billion, those
used might equal $500 million, and the surplus countries to which they
were presented, would suffer a reduction by that much in their
currencies which the deficit country might use in third countries.
Theoretically if not actually, if the measures taken by the U.S.A.
to reduce its deficit are successful, it will mean a corresponding
reduction in the surpluses of other countries. As these surpluses
gradually disappear where will the Managing Director find countries to
designate as the acceptor of SDR's?
Let us suppose that the War in Viet Nam ends, and the present
U.S.A. measures to reduce debits and increase credits succeed and
produce a surplus. Then presumably foreign governments that have a
deficit can ask the managing director to designate the U.S.A. as the
acceptor and our Treasury will have to resume paying out dollars-this
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time to finance the deficits of other governments under the guidance of
the Fund!
Let us suppose that the scheme has gone into effect and the
U.S.A. has used the allotted SDR's. Then comes the day when the U.S.
Treasury is supposed to pay back the currencies it has bought-and
reconstitute its holdings of SDR's. Does the payment of this debt have
priority over fulfilling its obligation to meet the demands of holders of
new issues of SDR's. Reciprocally, the U.S.A. will be entitled to
repayment of the dollars it has supplied in exchange for SDR's.
SDRs-Economic Aspects
Briefly, SDR's do not add anything new in the nature of a tangible
asset, but are merely a book entry in terms of a unit with an attributed
gold value. The owner can ask another participant in the Fund to
exchange them for gold. In this respect they may be likened to the
IOU's under the gold exchange standard. A foreigner Central Bank
could exchange them for U.S. gold at $35 an ounce. The new scheme
appears essentially to broaden the practice under the gold exchange
standard, with the innovation that the participant who is designated by
the Fund to accept them is obligated to deliver the equivalent amount
in its currency, or gold, or dollars or another currency.
Are SDRs Conducive to Inflation?
A challenging question for the economist is whether the use of
SDR's may have an increasingly inflationary effect. Mr. Jacques Rueff,
of France, has pointed out that the introduction of the gold exchange
standard in 1922, meant that Britain, the U.S.A. and others which
adopted it could issue interest-bearing IOU's redeemable in gold in
payment of international debts, i.e.. without suffering any reduction in
the gold backing for their currency. Taking it for granted that all their
creditors would not seek redemption at the same time, they indebted
themselves far in excess of their stock of gold. The amount of gold in
the debtor country's reserves thus did double duty: the inclusion of
these IOU's in the monetary reserves of the creditor countries, and of
the gold which backed them in the monetary reserves of the debtor
country, together conduced to disastrous inflation in the 1920's.
Basically SDR's are to supplement existing monetary reserves in
gold and foreign exchange which is partially backed by gold. The total
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stock of monetary gold is frozen at $40 billion, in accordance with a
recent agreement between Central Banks, but they can sell gold to each
other at the long-established price of $35.00 an ounce. The world total
of monetary reserves now reaches some $70 billion, made up of the $40
billion of gold, $15 billion of dollars, $6 billion of Sterling, $6 billion
of reserve positions in the IMF, and $2 billion miscellaneous. SDR's are
to be issued at the rate decided by the Governors of the IMF, which is
expected to be $1 or $2 billion a year. These are to be included in
reserve assets. However, SDR's are merely a call on a nation's existing
supply of currency which is carried out by allocating the amount
exchanged for SDR's from domestic use to international use. They
make the gold that backs the money go farther.
Under the existing gold exchange standard there is no limit to the
volume of IOU's that may be issued by Britain, the U.S.A. or other
countries except the willingness of the creditor to accept them. In
contrast, the quantum of SDR's issued each year is limited by the
Board of Governor's of the IMF. The quota allotted each government
constitues a further limitation. In order to assure more liquidity each
member, subject to certain conditions, is apparently authorized to
accept up to three times the amount of its quota, or even more, of the
SDR's of other governments. The recipient of the exchange may never
have to pay it all back if certain conditions are met.
Inflation was caused in the 1920's by making gold go twice as far
under the gold exchange standard as it had done under the gold
standard. An economist with a computer might figure out the
inflationary effect of a country's accepting more than three times its
quota of SDR's, and of the increasing number of issues during the
coming years of rights to call for currencies backed presently by some
$40 billion of gold and $30 billion of other assets. This effect may be
enhanced by the fact that SDR's can be transferred as freely as money
from one Central Bank to another in settlement of international debts.
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